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SUBTESTS OF "NONOBVIOUSNESS": A NONTECHNICAL
APPROACH TO PATENT VALIDITY
The application of legal standards to factual situations is often governed
by vague or conclusory criteria. Standards such as "reasonable man" or
"due process" have acquired a more definite legal content through repeated
exposure to judicial treatment. However, the legal standards applicable
to the validity of patent grants have not enjoyed the benefit of such a
transition. It will be the objective of this Note to assess the difficulties
which have obstructed the judicial development of one such standard, that
of "nonobviousness," and suggest means of avoiding these difficulties.'
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Standard of "Nonobviousness"
The Constitution grants Congress the power "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries . *.".., 2
The limitation of the grant of power to the promotion of progress implies
that some innovation be left for the free use of all.3 The test of "obvious-
ness" implements this policy by denying a monopoly when a particular
result could have been accomplished by anyone familiar with the art.4 The
test is codified in section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, which provides that a
patent may not be obtained if "the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains." r
Courts of the nineteenth century had little difficulty applying such a
test, since the technical level of innovation was low enough that a judge's
135 U.S.C. § 103 (1958). For other broad standards of patentability, see 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1958) ("new and useful"); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958) ("novelty").
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADE-
MARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 85TiH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
STUDY No. 7, EFFORTS To ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION 1-2
(Comm. Print 1958).
3 See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53
(1950).
He who is merely the first to utilize the existing fund of public knowl-
edge for new and obvious purposes must be satisfied with whatever fame,
personal satisfaction or commercial success he may be able to achieve. Pat-
ent monopolies, with all their significant economics and social consequences,
are not reserved for those who contribute so insubstantially to that fund of
public knowledge.
Dow Chem. Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320, 328 (1945).
4The test first appeared in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248
(1850). A patent for a clay-formed doorknob was held invalid because the substi-
tution of clay for metal was thought not to require "more ingenuity and skill . . .
than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business .... "
Id. at 267; see Reviser's Note to the 1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 21 (1959).
335 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
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native intelligence and education supplied the background necessary to an
understanding of the innovation's operation; he was able to place him-
self in the position of one skilled in the art in deciding whether the innova-
tion was "obvious." 6 However, revolutionary advances such as the tele-
graph and barbed wire seem elementary in comparison to the elusive chemi-
cal formulae or the intricate electronic circuits prevalent today. Given
their lack of technological training, it is not surprising that trial judges in
many cases find difficulty in understanding the innovations, the briefs,
and the exhibits.7 Judges are nevertheless constrained to apply a test of
nonobviousness better suited to a past age.8
B. Present Instruments of Decision-Making
Litigants presently rely on adversary experts to apprise the court of
technical issues.9 However, such experts are known to be excessively
partial so that these issues become distorted beyond even the point of
legitimate disagreement.' 0 Furthermore, it is doubtful that an expert can
teach the court enough physics or other science in the limited time available
to provide it with a sufficient working knowledge to cope with the more
technical facts. Therefore, a judge may revert to "a judicial hunch." "-
Such a method of decision-making is likely to result in inconsistent hold-
ings so that it is difficult for the inventor to assess the probability that his
patent will be upheld.' 2
1 See generally Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact
(pts. 1-2), 58 YALE L.J. 1019, 1242 (1949).
7 See Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. CHI. L. REV.
634, 641 (1950).
8 New methods of research such as team research, progressive laidout planning
and integration with business techniques, and language barriers between court and
patentees contribute to the difficulty. INLOW, THE PATENT GRANT 142 (1950) ; Kahn,
Fundamental Deficiencies in American Patent Law, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 475, 486
(1940).
9 See, e.g., Admiral Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1961).
See generally Smith, Scientific Proof, 52 YALE L.J. 586 (1943); Whinery, Role of
the Court Expert in Patent Litigation, in SUBCOM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY No. 8
(Comm. Print 1958).
10 Wigmore called them "virtually the retained partisan assistants of counsel."
2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 563, at 648 n.3 (3d ed. 1940) ; see Holstensson v. V-M Corp.,
198 F. Supp. 779, 787 (W.D. Mich. 1961), rev'd, 325 F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1963);
Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge To Call His Own Expert Witness, 29
So. CAL. L. REV. 195, 203 (1956) ; Whinery, supra note 9, at 6-7.
11 Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decisions, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929). Uncertain standards enable courts to
decide patent cases on extralegal grounds. In Vincent v. Suni-Citrus Prods. Co.,
215 F.2d 305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 952 (1955), the court affirmed a
Florida district court with the statement that the holding of invalidity was one "phase
of the long . . . struggle . . . to free [the state's] . . . large and growing citrus
waste processing industry from the adverse effects of patent monopoly control . ...
Id. at 305-06.
12 It has been said to be an "inescapable solipsism that subjects patent applications
to the test of as many different standards of patentability as there are district judges
... " Gross v. JFD Mfg. Co., 207 F. Supp. 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 314 F.2d
196 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 832 (1963). See generally Medina, A New
Judge Tries His First Patent Case, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 220 (1948).
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C. Abuses Engendered by Unpredictability
Powerful patentees are encouraged to misuse a system when the less
powerful cannot rely on the law,' 3 Less capitalized competitors are more
apt to settle infringement suits against them, so that invalid patents are
given the economic deference of valid ones.14 Unpredictability also dis-
courages poorer litigants from undertaking to assert valid patent rights,
thus denying them protection.' 5 As a result, inventors have less confidence
in the patent system and the expansion of unsanctioned monopoly is
facilitated.' 6 Writers, recognizing these shortcomings, have recommended
reforms such as patent infringement courts manned by specially trained
personnel, court-appointed technical experts, and Government intervention
in infringement actions.17 However, while present difficulties are in part
attributable to inadequate procedures, such reforms would provide only a
symptomatic cure of a more fundamental disease.' 8
D. The Need for Judicially Cognizable Standards
A transformation of the standards of invention from vague conclusory
terms to ones anchored in judicially cognizable facts would vitiate the need
for procedural reform while aiding in the development of a case-by-case
refinement and growth of the legal standard of patentability. 19 Since the
13 "Sheer economic power often counts for as much as does the worth of the
patent to the progress of science and useful arts." Kahn, supra note 8, at 485-86; see
Borkin, supra note 7, at 646; Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAw &
CONTEMY. PROB. 649, 661 (1947).
14 See the tactics of United Shoe Machinery Corporation and Alcoa described in
STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY & FREE ENTERPRISE 457 (1951). The patent
infringement suit has been called the most effective weapon for harassing competitors
and thwarting entry of new rivals. Fortune, Aug. 1942, pp. 105-32.
-5 The burden of litigation has been called an important factor in patent protection.
Deller, An Inquiry into the Uncertainties of Patentable Invention and Suggested
Remedies, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 152, 178 (1956) ; Stedman, supra note 13, at 649.
One estimate of the minimum cost in 1942 was $50,000. Borkin, supra note 7, at
646 n.29.
16 See Henry, Standards of Invention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 97 (1950). Even an unpredictable standard of validity may not discourage
inventors from innovating unless the grant of exclusivity is too arbitrary. It has
been asserted, however, that patents may be needed less as a lure for invention than
as a lure for investors. Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 642 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942) (Frank, J., concurring). If so, an unpredictable
standard could still have a deterrent effect on innovation, for investors are faced
with many more alternatives to research than are inventors.
17 See generally Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARv. L. Rxv.
1105 (1941).
Deller has urged that it "would be better to err on the side of granting a few
insignificant patents than destroy all incentives to innovation . . . .' Deller, supra
note 15, at 177. Compare EDwARDS, MAINTAINING CompzrrrioN 236 (1949).
IS The Supreme Court has not seen fit to resolve conflicting decisions over the
validity of individual patents or over the tests of validity. The Court has not reviewed
a patent validity case since the 1952 act. Recent dicta suggests that at least one
member of the Court entertains a begrudging view of patent validity. Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 351 (1962) (Black, J., con-
curring).
19 See generally STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY & FREE ENTERPRISE 449
(1951) ; Gerhardt, Patent Policy and Invention, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'x" 877 (1952).
1964]
1172 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vo1.112:1169
courts have difficulty in applying the broad standard of nonobviousness to
technical facts, subtests should be developed which would realize the policies
contained in the above standards but which would be based upon non-
technical facts.2 0  Some courts have developed and utilized such subtests,
often termed "indicia of invention." 21 The focus of these inquiries is upon
economic and motivational rather than technical issues; 22 the facts with
which to resolve such issues are more amenable to judicial treatment than
are the technical facts with which the courts generally struggle. Moreover,
they give direction to the statutorily-required inquiry as to whether the
innovation was obvious to those skilled in the art by furnishing a basis for
inferring. that had these artisans attempted a solution, it would or would
not have been obvious to them.
Some of the subtests to be considered have been consciously used by
courts, some are in the nature of proposals by writers, and others are
classifications arising from facts found in judicial opinions. Consideration
will be given to the nature and sources of the facts upon which the subtest
can be applied, their probative weight, their susceptibility to judicial
handling, and the relationship they bear to the standard of nonobviousness.
II. THE SUBTESTS OF PATENTABILITY
A. Longfelt Demand
The driving force behind innovation is the need for the improvement
of existing technology. A defect in a product or process spurs the business-
man to deploy resources for discovering a solution. High production costs,
undesirable side effects from the use of a product, or a limited period of
usefulness are typical of defects which will stimulate research. Existence
of the defect creates a demand for its correction, and it is reasonable to infer
that the defect would not persist were the solution "obvious." This is the
rationale of longfelt demand and its justification as a test of non-
obviousness.m
20 See Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent
Act of 1952, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 658 (1955).
21 Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170, 172-73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 823 (1962); Copease Mfg. Co. v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 298 F.2d
772, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1961); Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Shelby Poultry Co., 293 F.2d
127, 130-32 (4th Cir. 1961); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. General Elec.
Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946). See generally Note, The Statutory Standard
of Invention: Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 3 PATENT, TR"EARK & Copy-
RIGHT J. 317 (1959).
2 2 Judge Learned Hand noted such issues in Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961):
[H]ow long did the need exist; how many tried to find the way; how long
did the surrounding and accessory arts disclose the means; how immediately
was the invention recognized as an answer by those who used the new variant?
Id. at 504.
23 Facts indicative of longfelt demand have in general been prominent in judicial
decisions. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279
(1944); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 53-54, 68
(1923); Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 323 F.2d 29, 34 (4th Cir.
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Longfelt demand can be inferred by proof that a defect existed, but the
patentee must articulate the defect in need of solution.2 The more pro-
nounced and persistent the defect, the stronger the inference of longfelt
demand. Often, however, proper assessment of the magnitude of a defect
will be hampered if the necessary evidence is unavailable or is highly tech-
nical. In such a case a court can turn to other sources within an industry
for evidence showing that many skilled artisans have attempted to find a
solution to the problem which the patent in question purports to solve z5
Such evidence shows indirectly the presence of a significant defect while
serving as a simulated laboratory test of the obviousness of the solution to
a skilled artisan.
The amount of research expended by the industry is an important
source of evidence and this can be measured in terms of man-hours. In-
formation as to the research time devoted to the solution of similar problems
in the field would be of value in appraising the significance of the amount
of research for the defect under consideration.
A thousand monkeys working at a thousand benches for a thousand
years is impressive in monkey-hours, but one well-equipped technician
would undoubtedly produce superior innovations. Therefore, the quality
of research should also be examined.2 6 Research by simple repetitive
routines should not be the basis for an inference that the solution was not
1963) ; Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Ekstrom
Carlson & Co. v. Onsrud Mach. Works, Inc., 298 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962); Kingsland, The Statutes and Decisions Presenting the
Better Tests of Inventions, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 473, 478-80 (1952). But see White
v. Tak-trac, Inc., 140 U.S.P.Q. 156, 159 (S.D. Cal. 1963) ("a weak reed for a patentee
to lean upon"). In H.1a 4061, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948), a proposal for longfelt
demand as the statutory test is discussed. STAFF OF THE SUBcoMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COiM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., IST
SESS., STUDY No. 7, EFFORTS To ESTABLISH A STATUTORY STANDARD OF INVENTION
7-9 (Comm. Print 1958).
2 4 Hutchinson v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 319 F2d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1963);
Brooks v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 266 F.2d 841, 842 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 883
(1959). The fact that patentee has obtained many other patents in the area will not
substitute for articulation of the nature of the defect. Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth
Co., 305 F2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962).
25 National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 274 F.2d 224, 240 (6th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960); Ben Adler Signs, Inc. v. Wagner Sign
Serv., Inc., 112 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 692 (1940).
In Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Permacel-Le Page's, Inc., 222 F. Supp.
540, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1963) the court stated that "the best evidence [of validity] . . .
is the length of time during which the industry sought unsuccessfully to (innovate]
• . . as well as the extensive efforts of [patentee's] . . . staff."
2 Unsuccessful efforts must be by those familiar with the prior art. Fluor Corp.
v. Gulf Interstate Gas Co., 259 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir. 1958). In General Elec. Co. v.
DeForest Radio Co., 23 F.2d 698 (D. Del. 1928), aff'd, 283 U.S. 664 (1931), the
court noted that the "great and renowned" physicist Langmuir made many experiments
to achieve the patented result but was "traveling, all unknown to him, over a field
already well explored." Id. at 705. Articles in scientific journals and the experiments
themselves showed Langmuir's lack of knowledge of the prior art. 283 U.S. at 679-80.
The failure of Government scientists during a national emergency to solve a
problem has been called persuasive evidence of nonobviousness. Entron, Inc. v.
Jerrold Electronics Corp., 295 F.2d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1961).
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obvious to those skilled in the art. 7 However, courts will seldom encounter
such evidence for few competitive enterprises would allocate resources so
poorly.
Even if the research were not large in terms of man-hours, an invest-
ment large in dollars or large relative to capital or earnings could support
an inference that the solution was not obvious. The underlying presump-
tion would have to be that the research was a highly efficient operation
which would have suceeded had the solution been available.
Even in the absence of a showing of a mobilization of resources to solve
the problem, proof that a defect persisted for a long period of time could
support an inference that the solution would have been achieved had it been
obvious to those skilled in the art. 8 Finally, a showing that a large propor-
tion of the firms in an industry attempted to solve the problem could be the
basis for inferring a strong need.
The significance of a given period of time during which a defect was
present or even of a period of proven unsuccessful research can not be
determined by a single absolute standard, for the speed of innovation varies
from industry to industry. To create an inference of longfelt demand, the
time the defect persisted should at least be longer than the average time
lapse proceeding the unpatented solutions of defects in the relevant art.
2
9
In receiving evidence of unsuccessful research, courts must take care
that such research was conducted under the same state of the art as that
which confronted the patentee.8 0 It may be that an intervening innovation
made that which the patentee accomplished obvious even though it was
not obvious to prior unsuccessful researchers.
If the patentee is able to manipulate any of the factual elements of long-
felt demand, they will not accurately reflect demand or be support for in-
vention. For example, a patentee in a monopolistic or highly oligopolistic
industry would be in a position to suppress the solution to a problem in
order to give the appearance of a period of failure, while fear of a com-
27 See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 651 (1942) (L. Hand, J.) (decrying the use of trial and error research as
evidence of invention).
28 See E. J. Brooks v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 266 F.2d 841, 842 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 883 (1959) (patentee imprudently asserted in his patent application
that "recently there has been a demand"). But see It re Lechene, 277 F.2d 173
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (time lapse alone not proof of nonobviousness). In Savoy Leather
Mfg. Corp. v. Standard Brief Case Co., 261 F.2d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1958), the court,
in the absence of evidence, thought that a six-year lapse could be as plausibly at-
tributed to a belief of the industry of the nonpatentability of the advance as to
unsuccessful attempts at solution. Even if such a belief were proven, this should
not relieve the court of its obligation to determine patentability by other tests.
29 While a considerable time lapse is evidence of patent validity, a rapid solution
by the patentee should not necessarily be evidence against validity. See Ekstrom
Carlson & Co. v. Onsrud Mach. Works, Inc., 298 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962) (rapid solution indicates "inventive genius").
30 Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961) (dictum) ; Otto v. Koppers Co., 264 F.2d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 939 (1958); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530,
535 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955).
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petitor's successful innovation would deter such practices in a more com-
petitive field.
The facts relevant to the proof of longfelt demand would rarely be
technical, and thereby would be amenable to judicial treatment. Although
issues raised under the test are often questions of degree, for example, the
length of time to be required for unsuccessful research, or the weight to be
given to the ability and methods of unsuccessful researchers, such issues
seem to be suited to a case-by-case development of legal standards since
courts will be able to reason by analogy, even from one industry to another.
The test also furthers the constitutional directive of progress promotion in
two respects. First, potential innovators will be encouraged to innovate
if they know that their research efforts and those of their competitors will
ultimately aid in defending their patent. Furthermore, when proof of un-
successful research has been presented, it is improbable that the patent has
been granted for knowledge already in the hands of those skilled in the art.
This test would not be of help to a patentee with a pioneering invention
in a wholly new field, as there would have been no longfelt demand.31 This,
however, in no way curtails the value of longfelt demand in implementing
the section 103 test of "obviousness."
B. Commercial Success
The possibility of market success attendant upon the solution of an
existing problem may induce innovators to attempt a solution. If in fact
a product attains a high degree of commercial success, there is a basis for
inferring that such attempts have been made and have failed 3 2 Thus the
rationale is similar to that of longfelt demand and is for the same reasons a
legitimate test of invention.33 The operative facts, however, are the actions
of buyers rather than those of producers. The courts have recognized and
made use of such facts in the determination of patent validity.
The basic measure of commercial success should be the proportion of
the total market for the product that the patentee has obtained. However,
3' See Paramount Publix Corp. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 464,
474 (1935).
32 One court thought it incredible that with a latent demand of twenty-one million
units, researchers would have been blind to the patentee's solution had it really been
obvious. S. H. Kress Co. v. Aghnides, 246 F.2d 718, 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1958).
33 Commercial success has been thought to be strong evidence of validity when it
also appears that many highly trained artisans had been working on improvements
for many years. Kaakinen v. Peelers Co., 301 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 823 (1963) ; Georgia Pac. Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d
124, 133 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958) ; Kingsland, supra note 23, at
480-84.
34 Otto v. Koppers Co., 246 F.2d 789, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 939 (1958) (commercial success persuasive that solution not apparent to skilled
artisans) ; see Schumaker v. Gem Mfg. Co., 311 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Hayes
Spray Gun Co. v. E. C. Brown Co., 291 F.2d 319, 322 (9th Cir. 1961); Reiner v.
I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961);
Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 237 F.2d 594, 596 (3d Cir.
1956). See generally Costas, Discovery and the Issue of Commercial Success in
Patent Infringement Actions, 31 F.R.D. 215 (1963).
1176 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:1169
the significance of a particular share of a market may vary between in-
dustries, and therefore the legal standard should not be based solely on a
fixed percentage. Defining the relevant market may present difficulties for
a court, particularly when the innovation encroaches upon several inde-
pendent markets. Resort to sources such as the patentee's sales literature
could help in ascertaining the actual and potential uses for the product.
Another difficulty is presented by innovations which combine the qualities
of several previously independent products. In such a case the relevant
market could be circumscribed by considering the needs of diverse types
of buyers which potentially could be met by the innovation. For example,
where a new material combines the high strength of steel with the low
conductivity of ceramics, the relevant markets would consist of all sub-
stitute combinations of these qualities.
The presence of certain factors negate the significance of a showing of
commercial success. Market dominance due to attributes of the product
other than those for which the patent was granted, such as the color of the
product or the box in which it is packed, should not be used to sustain the
inference of validityY5 Factors such as these could often be detected by
consulting the patentee's sales literature and advertising or discussion of the
product in technical manuals or articles. However, if competitors of the
patentee have seen fit to incorporate the patented attribute in their own
products, it would be difficult to maintain that the patentee's success was due
to extraneous factorsY8
Although courts have occasionally brushed aside showings of commer-
cial success because they were due to "advertising," 37 the fact that a
35 Welsh Mfg. Co. v. Sunware Prods. Co., 236 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1956);
Bulldog Elec. Prods. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 105 F.2d 466, 468-69 (4th Cir. 1939) ;
Modern Millinery Box Corp. v. Boas Box Co., 219 F. Supp. 615, 618 (E.D. Pa.
1963); Kennatrack Corp. v. Stanley Works, 216 F. Supp. 394, 396-97 (N.D. Ill.
1961), aff'd, 314 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1962). But see American Safety Table Co. v.
Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 261 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959), where the
court indicated that complete market supercession relieved the court from determining
the amount of commercial success due to the patentable features. However, the bare
fact of supercession should be no basis for inferring nonobviousness.
36Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723, 728 (4th Cir. 1957), suggests that an infringer
could never successfully contend that nonpatented features were responsible for the
patentee's success. The court there dismissed such a contention on the grounds that
the infringer had, inconsistently with his allegation, chosen to incorporate the patented
device in his own product. However, it is only when a significant number of com-
petitors use the patented device that commercial success becomes hard to attack, not
when a sole infringer does so. The latter is, by definition, the case in every infringe-
ment suit.
3 7 Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 442
(1911); Deering Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 274 F.2d 626, 632-33 (2d
Cir. 1960). In Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., 66 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir.
1933), the court posited the need for close scrutiny to ascertain whether increased
sales were
due to advertisement . . . to an intensive sales drive, a consolidation of com-
peting industries, an abandonment of the manufacture of an old article, a
happy use of a trade name, a sharp revival of business, or any other means
which an alert management of an industry successfully adopts to sell a nation-
ally used article.
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patentee generated a market by extensive advertising does not per se
eliminate the inference of validity. Innovations often have no preexisting
market, and only by advertising can the product be brought to the attention
of potential buyers. This is not "creating one's own market," but is satisfy-
ing a latent demand. It is only when the commercial success results from
overstating the patented attribute of the product that it does not support
an inference of nonobviousness since buyer demand resulting in success
would have resulted from other than the attribute itself. It may be difficult
to distinguish success due to puffing from that which arouses a latent de-
mand. One possibility is to resort to evidence of market domination in
historical perspective.s If it appears that the innovation has permanently
displaced other products, it would be unlikely that success was due merely to
puffing.39 Finally, a court must be assured that the patentee's market
domination is not attributable to monopoly power or other economic
coercion, or to other factors unrelated to patent validity.40
The absence of commercial success can have an adverse effect upon
the validity of a patent to the extent that it rebuts any inference of a long-
felt demand. The patentee could at least neutralize the impact of a com-
mercial failure by showing that it was due to lack of capital, bankruptcy, or
similar factors unrelated to the operation of the patented product. Failure
due to a superior but different innovation by a competitor would support
a showing of longfelt demand.
The inference of nonobviousness is not as strong under this test as is
that drawn from a showing of longfelt demand,41 but a showing of both
presents a convincing case for patentability. Moreover, the factual issues
would rarely entail technical considerations. Therefore commercial suc-
cess should occupy an important role in the judicial repertoire of tests of
patent validity.
38 One court has required "evidence as to . . . sales by years [and] . . . evi-
dence permitting a quantitative comparison of . . . sales before and after the patent
... " National Lead Co. v. Western Lead Prods. Co., 324 F.2d 539, 545 (9th Cir.
1963). One writer believes that the difficulty in isolating factors such as excessive
advertising expenditures from commercial success renders the entire test of doubtful
value. ROBERTS, PATENTABILITY AND PATENT INTERPRETATION 181-82 (1927).
3 9 Failure of sales to remain at a high level led one court to find that commercial
success was due to unpatented features of the item. Ripple Sole Corp. v. American
Biltrite Rubber Co., 192 F. Supp. 551, 556 (D. Mass. 1961), aff'd, 302 F.2d 2 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 876 (1962).
4 0 See, e.g., Brooks v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 266 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 883 (1959) (Government agency encouraged use of patentee's prod-
uct). Judge Wyzanski in United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. Industrial Shoe Mach. Corp.,
223 F. Supp. 826, 831-32 (D. Mass. 1963), rejected immediate and widespread success
as proof of invention. He demanded proof not only of the actual demand for similar
machines but also that the large market and sales were chiefly attributable to the
technical advance and not to a dominant market position, monopoly power, peculiar
legal exchange agreements for old machines on lease, or unusual pricing policies.
41 The inference is not as strong only in the sense that it is often difficult to
ascertain when success is due only to the patented feature of the product, thereby
inducing less confidence in a showing of commercial success. See ROBERTS, op. cit.
mipra note 38.
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C. Commercial Acquiescence
Often those in an industry fail to challenge validity of a patent even
though they suffer economic injury because of the patented product. Such
behavior has been used by the courts in support of the validity of the
patent.4 The rationale stems from the probability that those in a field will
not so behave unless convinced of the patent's validity.43 The focus of the
test is upon the actions of those in the field toward the patent, not the actions
of the infringer.44
Commercial acquiescence is most frequently indicated by the grant of
licenses for a patented product.4 5 It would usually be more economical for
a licensee to copy the product than to pay royalties to a patentee, and the
willingness of the licensee to incur royalty costs would therefore justify an
inference of his belief in the validity of the patent and the resultant futility
of infringement. The more widespread the licensing the stronger the in-
ference of patent validity 46 The extent of licensing should be measured by
the percent of acquiescence in the total possible license market. However,
it is crucial that the licensees be primarily motivated by respect for the
patentee's legal rights. If other factors underlie a decision to license, the
arrangement may lose its evidentiary significance.
4 7
42 See, e.g., Eible Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 55-56
(1923) (licensing by competitors); Georgia Pac. Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 133-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884 (1958) (competitors
failed to infringe) ; Kingsland, supra note 23, at 482-83.
43 See Cold Metal Process Co. v. Republic Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 828, 836 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956) (court inferred nonobviousness from licensing
by the trade).
44 Courts often rely on prior actions by an alleged infringer indicative of ac-
quiescence. This rationale, however, contains an element of waiver or estoppel and
therefore must be distinguished from commercial acquiescence. See Georgia Pac.
Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 884 (1958). But see Interstate Rubber Prods. Co. v. Radiator Specialty
Co., 214 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1954) (infringer sought license; patent still invalid);
cf. Houston Oil Field Material Co. v. Claypool, 269 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1959)
(defendant applied for same patent; held invalid).
45 "More persuasive evidence than the action of competitors in taking licenses
and paying substantial royalties for the privilege of selling the patented article can
hardly be found." Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., 66 F.2d 162, 165 (7th
Cir. 1933). But see Deering, Milliken & Co. v. Temp-Resisto Corp., 274 F.2d 626,
633 (2d Cir. 1960) ("'Payment of very substantial royalties by licensees merely
means that [they] . . . have chosen to capitalize on [patentee's] . . . publicity and
process").
46 See Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Peterson Prods., 223 F. Supp. 803, 820
(N.D. Cal. 1963) (distribution of licenses not sufficiently widespread to support
validity).
47 See Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 55 (1923)
(five licensees producing 44% of industry output held stock in the patentee corpora-
tion; held insufficient to deny the aid of commercial acquiescence); Hobbs v. Wis-
consin Power & Light Co., 250 F.2d 100, 105 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
932 (1958) (license as a "favor" to patentee); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd.
v. Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1, 49-51 (D. Md. 1963) (fear of half million
dollar litigation fund motivated licensees); Senco Prods., Inc. v. Fastener Corp.,
168 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ill. 1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 932 (1960) (licensee took series of licenses from patentee).
SUBTESTS OF "NONOBVIOUSNESS"
Royalties may be so low that it is more economical to pay than to con-
test the validity of the patent,48 so that a showing by a patentee-licensor of
a series of arrangements yielding a relatively high return aids his case for
validity. However, a low-pricing arrangement should not be evidence
against patent validity since low rates might be set because the licensee
wishes to obtain widespread, high-volume royalty arrangements.
Licensing arrangements among supposed competitors may be proved
the result of a cooperative agreement to acquiesce in each other's innova-
tions, the purpose being to "rope off" the particular market from the alleged
infringer.49  A history of acquiescence in doubtful innovations or an un-
explained lack of research in key areas among competitors constitutes evi-
dence of such a scheme. Since only an outsider would challenge validity,
it is important that the challenge not be defeated because of mutually
planned acquiescence.
Another indication of commercial acquiescence is extensive research,
termed "circuminvention," by competitors designed to achieve the same
advantages as the patent by a different and noninfringing means.50 . It is
unlikely that the necessary resources would be expended if the patent's
validity were in doubt.
Actual copying of the innovation by a substantial number of com-
petitors without recognition of patentee's rights would logically weigh
against validity. Since, however, the ordinary bias of competitors would
be to disrespect the validity of a threatening patent, such evidence ought
rarely be determinative.51 However, it does have some probative weight
and could be considered in conjunction with evidence as to whether the
copier or the industry generally have respect for other patents. If those in
the field copy only after numerous unsuccessful attempts at circumvention
or after their licenses have expired, such copying should have slight adverse
effect upon validity for the facts would constitute positive evidence of
acquiescence.
48 In Kleinman v. Kobler, 230 F.2d 913, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
830 (1956), the court said that "to take a license, calling for small royalty payments,
frequently involves less expense than prolonged litigation . . . ." See Consolidated
Electrodynamics Corp. v. Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 260 F.2d 811, 817 (10th
Cir. 1958).
49 In Kleinman V. Kobler, supra note 48, the court found a patent invalid even
though two of the largest manufacturers took licenses along with two smaller firms.
"[I]f the licenses are few [they] . . . may deem it desirable to share a monopoly
which will endure while the patent-owner frightens off other users." Id. at 914.
5oSee S. H. Kress Co. v. Aghnides, 246 F.2d 718, 721 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 889 (1957).
51 In Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., 66 F.2d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1933),
the court stated in response to the infringer's defense that he was within his legal
rights in marketing an identical product: "Conceding for the moment its legal rights
[in so acting], the question exists, why change its type of vibrator unless the article
copied possessed merit? And why was not the change made earlier if the article
possessed merit and its production was obvious to a mechanic skilled in the art?"
As is often the case, the court failed to distinguish infringement by a defendant from
that by numerous other competitors. See Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 178
F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 915 (1950); McKee v. Graton &
Knight Co., 87 F.2d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1937) ; Black & Decker Mfg. Co. v. Baltimore
Truck Tire Serv. Corp., 40 F.2d 910, 914 (4th Cir. 1930).
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The facts upon which a showing of commercial acquiescence would be
predicated should present no difficulties to a court. Moreover, actions
against self-interest by those in the field constitute a more satisfactory basis
for inferring that an innovation is not obvious than either the testimony of
adversary experts or the "judicial hunch" arising from a survey of the
prior art by the court.
D. Simultaneous Solution
While a failure of other investigators to solve the problem solved by a
patentee is evidence of a longfelt demand, success of other investigators
considerably weakens the case for validity by suggesting that the means
thereof were already within the public domain.5 2 The term "simultaneous"
is here used merely to stress the requirement that all successful investigators
be faced with the same state of the art, for only then can it be inferred from
other solutions that the patented solution was obvious. It is not necessary
that the solution occur after the patented one, although this would normally
be the case as an already existing solution often bars grant of a patent
under the statutory requirement of "novelty." 53
A patentee can dispel an inference of obviousness by showing that the
state of the art confronting him was different from that confronting an al-
leged simultaneous solver. This could be done where the art had been
advanced by intervening developments which made possible or facilitated
the second solution. In the absence of concrete evidence of intervening
developments, their presence may be inferred from a substantial time span
between the two solutions, the strength of this interference depending upon
the rate of innovation in the industry.
Assuming an absence of intervening developments, identical solutions
are highly persuasive evidence of obviousness. The simultaneous solution
must be reached independently. However, the fact that the second solver
knew of patentee's success does not destroy automatically the significance
of the second solution since it is possible to know that a solution has oc-
curred without knowing the exact means by which it was accomplished.
Knowledge that a solution has been achieved may in fact spur innovative
efforts on the part of competitors. A rapid independent replication of the
patentee's solution would be an effective laboratory demonstration that,
given an impetus to innovate, the solution was obvious to skilled artisans. 4
52 Audio Devices, Inc. v. Armour Research Foundation, 293 F.2d 102, 107 (2d
Cir. 1961) ; Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy Sporting Goods, Inc., 233
F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Graham v. Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc., 206 F.2d 769, 771 (5th
Cir. 1953) ; Kay Patents Corp. v. Martin Supply Co., 202 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1953);
Hamilton & Till, What is a Patent?, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 245 (1948).
53 E.g., Graham v. Jeoffroy Mfg., Inc., supra note 52, at 771; see 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1958).
5 4 Audio Devices, Inc. v. Armour Research Foundation, 293 F.2d 102, 107 (2d
Cir. 1961). However, a court must be certain that the solver had no access to any
aspects of patentee's means of solution. Since patent applications are kept secret
until issuance of the patent, the burden upon the infringer urging a simultaneous
solution would be easier to meet if the solution were arrived at before rather than
after issuance.
SUBTESTS OF "NONOBVIOUSNESS"
The mere fact of a second solution would not necessarily mean that
the patentee's solution was obvious, for the two solutions may be so dis-
similar that no inference could be drawn that what the patentee did was
obvious. The similarity of the solutions would in most instances be a ques-
tion of degree, although there are tools available for the assessment of such
differences. One such test is the doctrine of equivalency, developed to
resolve the issue of infringement, which is addressed to the question of
whether the methods of solution before the court are used in the art as
common alternatives.5 5 The shortcoming of this test is that it often entails
complex technological considerations, thereby diminishing the utility of
simultaneous solution as an indicium of invention.
In appraising the probative weight of a simultaneous solution, the skill
possessed by the simultaneous solver must be taken into account, for a solu-
tion which a novice could achieve would presumably have been obvious to
one skilled in the art. However, a second solution by an expert would not
be fatal to a patent claim, since it still could be maintained that the solution
was not obvious to a skilled artisan.5 6 The efforts expended by the second
solver also should influence the weight to be given a simultaneous solution;
if produced in a short time, an inference of obviousness is considerably
strengthened, while if it was turned out as a product of group research over
an extensive period of time, the inference is not as compelling.
A problem of proving simultaneous solution is the inaccessibility of evi-
dence that a second solution has occurred. Discovery devices would al-
leviate the problem with respect to information held by the plaintiff-
patentee, but access to nonparty records may be difficult. In a competitive
industry a second solver would be as interested in attacking the validity of
a patent as is the defendant infringer, but in an industry dominated by a
few major researchers, mutual respect for one another's patents may render
evidence of a second solution unavailable to an outsider.
The absence of a showing of a simultaneous solution should not aid the
patentee's case for validity, for without additional facts the inference of
nonobviousness is tenuous. The kinds of facts which would strengthen
such an inference, such as a period of unsuccessful research, are precisely
those supporting a showing of longfelt demand.
E. Professional Approval
The opinions of highly skilled experts can aid a court in the deter-
mination of obviousness. From the knowledge of expert evaluation of an
55 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-10 (1950).
In Williams Iron Works Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 109 F.2d 500, 503 (10th Cir. 1940),
the court looked to "the modes or means of operation, the functions, and the effects
of the patented device and the accused device. . . . Otherwise stated . . . whether
the two devices do the same work in substantially the same way and accomplish sub-
stantially the same result."
66 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1,
16-17 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 268 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1959).
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innovation, a court can infer whether or not it would have been obvious
to those of lesser skill such as is possessed by an artisan in the field. Thus,
where trade publications all hail a product as a boon to consumers and
deserving of a patent, a court could properly use such facts in support of
validity. Courts should consider approval from sources such as text writers,
technologists, scientific commentators, and university professors.5 7 Use of
this type of expert approval entails a smaller risk of distortion than use of
adversary experts.
Even though an expert does not shower praise upon an innovation,
his opinion can nevertheless be of value to a court. Thus, if a skilled expert
were unable to comprehend an innovation, it would be unlikely that it
would have been obvious to a skilled artisan.5 8 Similarly, if before the
issuance of a patent an expert had maintained that what the patentee in fact
did could not be done, an inference of nonobviousness would be entirely
justified.5 9
An additional source of professional approval is statements of com-
petitors bearing upon the validity of the patented product. By extolling the
virtues of a patent in a training course or by calling the product revolu-
tionary, competitors or infringers have indicated such approval.60
The issues raised by this test would consist largely of assessing the
significance of a professional's remarks and would present few difficulties to
a court. Thus, it would be crucial for a court to know whether the state-
ment of a competitor was either self-serving or against interest. Questions
may also arise as to the meaning of an expert's remarks. While in such
a case it may be possible for the writer to testify in court, this procedure
would reintroduce the risk of partiality inherent in an adversarial setting
and should be relied upon sparingly by the courts.
-5 See Twentier's Research, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 319 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.
1963); Ex parte Brockmann & Bohne, 127 U.S.P.Q. 57 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959).
Compare National Latex Prods. v. Sun Rubber Co., 274 F.2d 224, 240 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 989 (1960) (technical dictionary defined process in terms of
patentee's use).
Holdings of other courts on the same patent may be given an effect similar to
that of professional comment when the validity of a patent is relitigated. See Mast,
Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900); Crozier-Straub, Inc. v.
Reiter, 34 F.2d 577 (E.D. Pa. 1929). Prior decisions on the same patent have been
called "stare decisis." Cold Metal Process Co. v. E. W. Bliss Co., 285 F.2d 231,
236 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961) ; see Technical Tape Corp. v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d 343, 349 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 952 (1958).
58 General Tire Co. v. Watson, 184 F. Supp. 344, 348-49 (D.D.C. 1960); see
McKee v. Graton & Knight Co., 87 F.2d 262, 264 (4th Cir. 1937) (trade initially
skeptical of device's utility) ; National Battery Co. v. Richardson Co., 63 F.2d 289,
292 (6th Cir. 1933) (trade incredulous).
59 See Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Shelby Poultry Co., 293 F.2d 127, 131 (4th Cir.
1961).
60 See Otto v. Koppers Co., 246 F.2d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 939 (1958) ; Sel-O-Rak Co. v. Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp., 232 F.2d
176, 179 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956); Ibis Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Spray-Bilt, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 65, 76 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
SUBTESTS OF "NONOBVIOUSNESS"
F. Progress Through the Patent Office
Courts and writers have been of the opinion that the Patent Office is
overly liberal in granting exclusive rights to an innovation. This tendency
is attributed in part to a policy that progress is better promoted if in close
or doubtful cases patents are initially granted rather than denied61 and in
part to less than stringent Patent Office procedures.0 2 In any event litigated
patents have had a high rate of invalidation by the courts. 3 Therefore,
when it appears that a patentee has experienced certain difficulties in the
Patent Office, courts have drawn inferences adverse to the patentee's claim
of validity. Thus, the refusal of the Office to issue a patent until the ap-
plicant altered some of his claims has been used by the Courts as support for
a determination of invalidity.6 4 One possible justification for attaching
significance to the alteration of claims by the Patent Office is that this, in
effect, is a narrowing of the subject matter of the claim, making the claim a
less significant advance and therefore more likely to have been obvious to
those skilled in the art. However, it is just as reasonable to assume that
the alteration was merely a clarification of a properly patentable innovation.
To penalize altered claims would seem merely to put a premium on retain-
ing patent counsel to draft cautiously worded applications for limited patent
grants. There is also a risk that the courts will fail to differentiate the
clarification of a valid claim from mere artful restatement of the obvious,
which, through semantics, gives a simple improvement a patentable
appearance.
To the extent that use of Patent Office occurrences represents a nega-
tive attitude toward the Office, an explicit repudiation of this test of validity
will not solve the basic problem. However, the relevance of such facts to
the standards of patentability remains slight; if courts abandon the test, they
might at least resort to more relevant facts in reaching and justifying their
decisions.
61 Deller, An. Inquiry Into the UMertainty of Patentable Invention, and Suggested
Remedies, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 152, 177 (1956).
62 1n Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth, 305 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962), the court
refused to allow the presumption of validity from the grant to alter "the preponderance
of the evidence" against validity since "unavoidable obstacles to an accurate and
impartial decision . . . are inherent in ex parte proceedings in the patent office
In 1878 a congressional witness is said to have claimed that the Office has "edu-
cated a body of examiners who can discriminate where there is no difference." See
HAMILTON & TILL, WHAT IS A PATENT?, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 245, 253 n.24
(1948).
03 Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit-Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. CHI. L. REv.
634, 646 (1950).
64 See Gentzel v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 230 F.2d 341, 345 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 840 (1956) ; Bendix Aviation Corp., 218 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D.
Md. 1963). But see McKee Door Co. v. Forest Door Co., 284 F.2d 809, 811, 815
(7th Cir. 1960) (earlier court holding of validity outweighs Patent Office difficulties).
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III. CONCLUSION
This note has outlined only the subtests for the section 103 standard of
nonobviousness with which the courts have particularly struggled; sub-
tests should similarly be defined for the other standards of patent validity.
A nontechnical approach to patent cases may provide in time a workable
body of precedent for courts to apply, and greater certainty for patentees.
Richard L. Robbins
